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ABSTRACT: Over the past three decades Germany has repeatedly deregulated the 
law on temporary agency work by stepwise increasing the maximum period for 
hiring-out employees and allowing temporary work agencies to conclude fixed-
term contracts. These reforms should have had an effect on the employment dura-
tion within temporary work agencies. Based on an informative administrative data 
set we use hazard rate models to examine whether the employment duration has 
changed in response to these reforms. We find that the repeated prolongation of 
the maximum period for hiring-out employees significantly increased the average 
employment duration while the authorization of fixed-term contracts reduced em-
ployment tenure. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: In den vergangenen drei Dekaden hat die deutsche Regie-
rung das Leiharbeitsrecht mehrfach dereguliert. Betroffen hiervon waren vor allem 
die Überlassungshöchstdauer und die Erlaubnis, befristete Arbeitsverträge abzu-
schließen. Mit administrativen Daten untersuchen wir die Frage, ob die Reformen 
des Leiharbeitsrechts Einfluss auf die Beschäftigungsdauer in Leiharbeitsfirmen 
hatten. Mit der Überlassungshöchstdauer sind auch die Beschäftigungsdauern 
zunächst signifikant gestiegen, wohingegen die Zulassung von befristeten Arbeits-
verträgen zu kürzerer Beschäftigung in Leiharbeit geführt hat. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
Whether temporary agency work can improve the labor market outcomes of the 
unemployed has recently become the subject of both policy and research interest. 
It is often argued that employment spells in temporary work agencies increase 
workers’ human capital and provide the opportunity to gain work experience. While 
being on assignment, temporary agency workers can develop labor market contacts 
that lead to stable employment or at least to longer-term employment (Jahn 2005, 
Houseman et al. 2003). In contrast to this view, it may be argued that human capital 
effects cannot be strong since temporary work agencies primarily offer very short 
low-skilled jobs that are often below the qualification of the worker and that tempo-
rary agency work provides no significant possibility to develop productive job search 
networks (Segal/Sullivan 1997). Despite this objection Zijl et al. (2004) find evidence 
that temporary agency work in the Netherlands substantially reduces unemployment 
duration and increases subsequent job stability. Studies by Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 
(2005) and Ichino et al. (2006) also find positive employment effects for workers in 
Spain and Italy, respectively, even though these results apply most notably for spe-
cific labor market groups. García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2005) examine to what 
extent previous experience in temporary employment agencies affects workers’ 
transition rates from unemployment in the Spanish youth labor market. They show 
that previous employment experience in a temporary employment agency reduces 
unemployment duration and has a positive impact for the short term unemployed 
on the likelihood of leaving unemployment. The results by Autor and Houseman 
(2005) for the USA and Kvasnicka (2005) for Germany are less encouraging. Both 
studies find no strong support for the stepping-stone function of temporary agency 
work. 
 
One reason for these rather mixed results might indeed be that the employment 
duration in temporary agency work, which is strongly regulated in most OECD 
countries by law, is rather short. Regulations, which primarily affect the duration of 
a temporary work agency contract are the permission to conclude fixed-term con-
tracts, the restriction on the number of renewals, the maximum cumulated duration 
of temporary work contracts as well as the maximum period for continuously hiring  
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out employees to a single user firm. Even though most OECD countries limit the 
length or the number of renewals of a temporary agency work contract (OECD 
2004), only Germany (until 2003), Italy, the Netherlands (until 1999), Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg and Portugal limit the length of an assignment to a user firm 
(Arrowsmith 2006, Storrie 2002). Despite the continuing liberalization of the tem-
porary help sector in most OECD countries over the last two decades, up to now, 
there has been no research regarding the effect of these reforms on the employ-
ment tenure within a single temporary work agency. Germany is an interesting ca-
se to analyze because its temporary help sector is still one of the most regulated 
among the OECD countries. All the more because temporary agency employment 
has substantially grown during the past decade with an annual growth rate of 
10 percent, see Figure 1. 
 
Over the past three decades the German government has repeatedly amended 
the law on temporary agency work. This process of deregulation started in 1985. 
One main focus of these reforms was the stepwise extension of the maximum pe-
riod for hiring-out employees. Furthermore, in the mid 90s temporary work agen-
cies obtained permission to conclude fixed-term contracts with their employees. All 
reforms were designed on the one hand to increase employment stability within 
the temporary work agency. On the other hand the deregulation was meant to in-
crease flexibility and encourage firms to recourse to temporary agency workers 
rather than to internal adjustment instruments such as overtime when adjusting to 
variations in output demand. To some extent the strictness of the German regula-
tion of temporary agency work might be responsible for the relatively small share 
of these workers to total employment when compared to other European coun-
tries. Nevertheless these legal changes should have had an effect on the employ-
ment duration within temporary work agencies. In this paper a mixed proportional 
hazard rate model is used to examine whether the employment duration in the 
German temporary help sector has changed in response to these reforms. 
 
Lack of longitudinal data on individual employment histories for temporary agency 
workers has largely precluded empirical research on the employment duration of 
temporary agency workers in Germany. The only available study by Ru-
dolph/Schröder (1997) merely addressed those aspects on a descriptive basis.  
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Schröder (1997) used event history techniques but limited her analysis to 1980-
1990 and did not address the question whether the employment duration changed 
in response to the reform during her observation period. Brose et al. (1990) exam-
ined employment duration in temporary agency work using descriptive statistics 
but again without any special reference to the effect of the reforms. 
 
Recently an extended version of the IAB employment sample (IABS) has become 
available which now allows the analysis of such questions. The data set is of ad-
ministrative nature and provides longitudinal and high quality information on the 
individual employment and unemployment history of temporary agency workers 
covering the reforms between 1980 and 2003. The central question of the paper is 
whether the amendments to the law affect the employment duration with a tempo-
rary work agency and whether the employment duration varies according to socio-
economic characteristics. We do not address the question whether these legal 
changes have had an effect on the stepping-stone function of temporary agency 
work. The reason is that on average 30 percent of all temporary agency workers in 
Germany were out of the labor force prior to entry in temporary work agencies. For 
these workers we can not differentiate whether they accept agency work as a con-
scious choice to work in a dynamic environment or as a means to find permanent 
stable employment. Restricting our analysis to temporary agency workers who 
were previously unemployed would partly solve this problem but would heavily 
affect our results on employment duration. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The legal framework and the development of 
the temporary help sector in Germany are described in Section 2. Section 3 out-
lines our main hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data, discusses the explana-
tory variables and provides an explorative analysis. Section 5 is devoted to our 
estimation strategy and the results. Section 6 presents the results of our sensitivity 




2.   TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK IN GERMANY 
By international standards, the German labor market is highly regulated (OECD 
2004). One consequence is that Germany is suffering from a high and still 
increasing unemployment rate while economic growth is modest. In contrast, the 
German temporary help service industry has reasonably steadily grown for the last 
three decades. The number of temporary agency workers increased from 47,000 
in 1980 to about 454,000 in 2005, see Figure 1. Despite an average annual growth 
rate of about 9 percent between 1980 and 2005, the share of temporary agency 
workers reached only 1.2 percent of total employment in 2005. Nevertheless, the 
actual labor market flows give the temporary agency work sector an even greater 
importance than any stock figure or its share of total employment would suggest. 
In 2005 on average about 444,000 workers were employed by the temporary help 
service industry but 738,000 new temporary work contracts were concluded and 
724,000 terminated. Therefore the dynamics of this labor market segment are all 
but negligible. 
 








































































































































































































































Source:   Labor Placement Statistics, Federal Employment Agency 
 
Various reasons for the rising demand for temporary agency workers have been 
proposed. These include the reluctance of firms to increase their labor force on a 
permanent basis during the economic cycle and idiosyncratic variation of output 
demand in particular; reduction of labor costs to circumvent the wages bargained  
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in sectoral collective agreements; savings in direct labor costs, including continued 
payment of wages for sickness; reduction in administrative costs and immediate 
responses to sudden changes in work requirements. Firms also use temporary 
agency work to circumvent the relatively strict German employment protection 
legislation. The primary advantages are claimed to be that employment contracts 
may be terminated without notice, firing costs can be reduced and labor disputes 
can be avoided. Last but not least the stepwise deregulation of the quite strict 
regulation of temporary agency work may be one reason for the expansion of the 
temporary agency work sector. 
 
In Germany, temporary agency work is regulated by the Labor Placement Act, 
which came into force in 1972. Since then, agencies must register and receive 
authorization by the German Federal Employment Agency. Legislation on tempo-
rary agency work has been amended repeatedly over subsequent years. Some of 
the changes were tentative at the outset, see Table 1. 
 
In most countries temporary agency work is associated with a fixed-term contract. 
In contrast, Germany allowed temporary agency work at first only on the basis of 
an open ended contract. During periods without assignment the temporary work 
agency is obliged to continue wage payments and contributions to the social secu-
rity system. The maximum period of assignment to the user firm was limited to 
three months. In this way, several successive assignments should be combined to 
a long lasting and stable employment relationship between the temporary agency 
worker and the temporary work agency. Furthermore, client firms should be pre-
vented from substituting regular employees by temps. In order to prevent tempo-
rary work agencies from circumventing legal regulations concerning the require-
ment of an open ended contract, legislation on temporary agency work included a 
ban on re-employment and a ban on synchronization. The ban on re-employment 
prohibits the agency from terminating the contract and then repeatedly re-
employing the worker within a three-month period. This regulation permits a one-
time termination and re-employment. However, this rule does not apply if the 
worker quits. The ban on synchronization requires that the employment contract to 
exceed the length of the initial placement. As a rule of thumb, case law determined 
that this requirement is fulfilled if the employment duration exceeds the first as- 
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signment by at least 25 percent. This rule does not apply if the first assignment is 
followed by a second (short) assignment. 
 






from May 1, 1985  Extension of the maximum period of assignment to a client firm from 3 to 
6 months until December 31, 1989, prolongation in 1990 until 1995 
positive 
from Jan 1, 1994  • Extension of the maximum period of assignment to a client firm from 6 
to 9 months until 2000, 
•  Elimination of the synchronization ban for hard-to-place unemployed 
assigned by the Federal Employment Agency 
positive 
from April 1, 1997  • Extension of the maximum period of assignment to a client firm from 9 
to 12 months, 
• Acceptance of synchronization of initial assignment to a client firm and 
employment contract with the temporary agency worker, 
• Acceptance of a one-time fixed-term contract without objective reasons, 
•  Renewal of fixed-term-contracts with the same temporary agency 
worker is possible if the new contract follows the previous contract im-
mediately 
negative 
from Jan 1, 2002  • Extension of the maximum period of assignment to a client firm from 12 
to 24 months, 
• Principle of equal treatment after 12 months 
no effect 
from Jan 1, 2003  •  Elimination of the synchronization and re-employment ban and the 
maximum period of assignment to a client firm, 
• Liberalization of the ban of temporary agency work in the construction 
sector, 
• Principle of equal treatment, unless a collective bargaining agreement 
specifies otherwise 
negative 
Source: Jahn  (2004) 
 
In the following years, a number of legal reforms were passed. The maximum pe-
riod of assignment was expanded from three to six months in 1985, from six to 
nine months in 1994 and again in 1997, this time from nine to twelve months. In 
1997 fixed-term contracts and the synchronization of the first contract between an 
agency and a temporary worker were allowed. A fixed-term contract could be pro-
longed or renewed three times until the total employment duration added up to 24 
months. The option to renew a fixed-term contract was later restricted by the Act 
on Part-Time and Fixed-Term Contracts in 2001. Accordingly, such contracts had 
to be open-ended after a first limited contract period unless the personal charac-
teristics of the worker or objective reasons, as e.g. the replacement of an em-
ployee on maternity leave, justified otherwise. 
 
In 2002 the maximum period of assignment increased up to 24 months. From the 
13
th month of an assignment on, the principle of equal treatment applied. The tem- 
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porary agency worker had the right to the same remuneration and equivalent 
working conditions as comparable employees directly employed at the user firm. 
 
The Labor Placement Act was again modified in 2003.
1 Since then, the temporary 
work agency has been allowed to assign an agency worker without any time limits. 
The ban on synchronization and the ban on re-employment were abolished. How-
ever, fixed-term contracts continued to be regulated by the provisions of the Act on 
Part-time and Fixed-term Contracts. At the same time, the rights of temporary 
agency workers were further strengthened as the principle of equal treatment was 
in effect from the very first day of an assignment. This can be avoided by the 
agency for up to 6 weeks if the hired employee has previously been unemployed. 
In this instance, the temporary work agency is permitted to remunerate the worker 
with a net pay rate equal to the recent unemployment benefits. The contracting 
parties may also circumvent the principle of equal treatment if a sectoral collective 
agreement applies. As a result numerous collective agreements were concluded in 
the temporary work sector during 2003. Consequently, the principle of equal 
treatment has no practical effect for most temporary agency workers. In addition, 
the new legislation governing temporary agency work established a new instru-
ment of active labor market policy. Starting in 2003, the public employment service 
has used subsidized temporary agency work as part of its job placement activities. 
The aim of the so called “Personnel-Service-Agencies” is to get the unemployed 
back into regular work by transition through temporary work.
2 
 
3.   HYPOTHESES 
Given that our data set covers the period from 1975 to 2004, we are able to exam-
ine the effects of the reforms of the Labor Placement Act since it came into effect. 
Due to the stepwise prolongation of the maximum period of assignment we expect 
                                            
1  The reform of 2003 guaranteed a transition period of one year for the temporary work agencies. 
A detailed description of the development of the Labor Placement Act is given in Jahn (2002). 
2   Since 2003 each local employment agency has been obliged to establish at least one Person-
nel-Service-Agency. For details on the characteristics of this instrument of active labor market 
policy, see Jahn/Ochel (2005).  
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the duration of the assignment periods to have increased. As a consequence em-
ployment duration with the agency should have increased for the following rea-
sons. In order to minimize periods without assignment, and therefore the staffing 
costs, temporary work agencies have an incentive to conclude employment con-
tracts that do not exceed the assignment period with the client firm. This strategy 
is first of all of benefit when there are fluctuations or uncertainties with respect to 
the demand for their services, and secondly, if user firms request specialized 
workers, for which the temporary work agency can hardly find a subsequent as-
signment with similar qualification requirements, and third if user firms occasionally 
request a large contingent of workers. In the latter case, a temporary work agency 
will not search for suitable workers until a specific request is on-hand. Such work-
ers will then be hired specifically for that request on a temporary basis. 
 
Until 1997 it was the aim of the Labor Placement Act to prevent the synchroniza-
tion of the employment contract with the first assignment. Nevertheless, several 
legal loopholes allowed the temporary work agencies to circumvent the principle of 
open-ended contracts. For instance, a temporary work agency could easily dis-
miss and re-employ a worker once within the probationary period of six months. 
After an interruption of three months re-employment was possible. Furthermore, a 
renewal of the employment contract was allowed if the previous one had been 
terminated at the request of the worker herself. Moreover, the ban on synchroniza-
tion did not prohibit a very short assignment of e.g. one day’s duration after the 
primary one. In doing so, the agencies could circumvent this regulation as well. 
Therefore we hypothesize that the employment duration at the temporary work 
agency rarely exceeded the assignment periods. 
 
The Dismissal Protection Act allows the employer to dismiss an employee during 
the probationary period with a notice period of two weeks without requiring justifi-
cation. As a result, temporary work agencies were essentially free to terminate all 
contracts within the trial period. Given that the probationary period was equal to or 
longer than the maximum period of assignment prior to 1994, most temporary 
work agencies might have taken advantage of the opportunities of the Dismissal 
Protection Act. Consequently, we expect that the employment duration increased 




In 1994 the government again raised the maximum period of assignment, this time 
from six to nine months. As soon as an employment contract exceeds the proba-
tionary period, the termination of a contract requires a justification. If the demand 
for a temporary worker is longer than six months firms can circumvent employment 
protection legislation by requesting a temp. Thus we propose that the demand for 
temps should have increased. However, hiring a temp is expensive due to a mark-
up factor of 2.5 on gross wages. The advantage of temporary agency work for the 
client firm lies primarily in the immediate adjustment to unexpected fluctuations in 
product demand (Bellmann 2004, Boockmann/Hagen 2001). If a firm expects a 
long-term increase of additional staff, it may be more economical to directly recruit 
a temporary worker. As a rule of thumb the breakeven point at which it is cheaper 
to hire a temporary worker is approximately six months (Schröder 1997). Thus, we 
suppose that the second reform had a positive effect on the employment duration 
with the agencies as well. However, we expect the impact to be less pronounced 
than that of the reform in 1985. 
 
In 1997 the maximum period of assignment was extended up to 12 months. Given 
that even today most placements still last less than six months, this deregulation is 
unlikely to have fundamentally increased employment duration (Bellmann et al. 
2003, Kvasnicka 2004). In addition, the synchronization ban was relaxed by allow-
ing temporary work agencies to conclude a fixed-term contract for the duration of 
the first assignment. Therefore, it is not likely that the third extension of the maxi-
mum period of assignment had a prolonging effect on the employment duration. 
The overall effect of this reform on employment duration might even have been 
negative. 
 
The maximum period of assignment was again extended in 2002, this time from 12 
to 24 months. As mentioned before, if a client firm has a need for additional staff 
for such a long period it may be cost minimizing to hire staff on a fixed-term basis 
instead of repeated recourse to temporary agency work. The principle of equal 
treatment which applied from the 13
th month of an assignment on may also not 
have encouraged longer employment periods because it increased the cost of  
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temporary staff. However, the overall effect of this reform remains ambiguous as 
well, and we do not expect a noticeable effect on employment duration. 
 
The recent reform in 2003 nearly abolished all regulations and left the parameters 
of the employment contract subject to collective bargaining. Therefore we expect a 
pronounced reduction of employment duration. Our hypotheses are summarized in 
Table 1. 
4.   DATA AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
4.1 DATA 
We use an extended version of the IABS, which permits analyses at the individual 
level
3. The IABS contains a two percent random sample of all German employees 
registered with the social security system. Supplementary information on regis-
tered unemployment spells at the employment office is added to the sample. Being 
of administrative nature the IABS provides longitudinal and high quality information 
on the employment and unemployment history of employees. Temporary agency 
workers are identified by an industry classification code, which allows us to identify 
those workers covered by the social security system in professional temporary 
work agencies. Firms that place their employees only on a sporadic basis (so-
called mixed firms) can not be identified by this code. Therefore about 87 percent 
of all placed temps in our sample are included in the analysis (Jahn/Wolf 2005). 
The missing information on temporary agency workers employed in mixed firms 
has no effect on our results because the reforms of the Labor Placement Act are 
likely to affect primarily the employment behavior of professional agencies. 
 
Each employment and unemployment spell contains starting and ending date and 
provides accurate information on the timing of transitions from temporary agency 
                                            
3   The original IABS records data for the period 1975 to 2001. By adding employment spells of 
individuals included in the original data set administered by the Federal Employment Agency 
for 2002 to 2004, the reform of 2003 can be analyzed as well. A description of an earlier ver-
sion of the data set can be found in Bender et al. (2000) and Hamann et al. (2004).  
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work to another labor market status. Using an inflow sample over the period 1980 
to 2003 with censoring on December 2004, we can investigate and compare the 
effects of the five reforms between 1985 and 2003. For administrative reasons 
approximately 85 percent of the employment spells are updated for 2004. We 
suppose that register information is particularly incomplete for new employment 
relationships. To avoid any distorting effects we therefore excluded all spells start-
ing in 2004. The reference to employment spells rather than workers implies that 
temporary agency workers with multiple completed temporary agency spells within 
the same firm or with another employer in a given period are included repeatedly. 
If a temporary agency spell is followed by a new spell without interruption at the 
same employer employment duration of these two spells are added. 
 
Nevertheless, the IABS also has disadvantages. First, temporary agency workers 
cannot be distinguished from the permanent administrative staff of the agencies, 
which accounted for about 7 percent in 2003 (Jahn/Wolf 2005). Second, as the 
source of the employment data is social security administration records, no infor-
mation on the number and duration of placements and the client firm is available. 
Finally, as long as a jobseeker is not registered with the employment agency or at 
the social security system, their employment history is interrupted. That implies 
that, although a worker might be looking for a job but is not registered with the 
employment agency, the jobseeker will be considered as out of the labor force. 
 
Information for East Germany is available since 1992. In order to investigate the 
effect of the reform in 1985 as well we concentrate our analysis on West German 
workers. Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to full-time employees aged be-
tween 15 and 64. Contrary to the US, temporary agency jobs in Germany rarely 
are second jobs. Due to lack of information on the number of hours worked, we 
exclude part-time employees, trainees, interns and home-workers. In light of the 
low number of cases, we exclude temporary agency workers in agriculture and 




4.2 DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
Our dependent variable is the employment duration within the temporary work 
agency. The five regulatory regimes are coded as dummy variables. Temporary 
agency work contracts still in effect on the date of legal change are attributed to 
the preceding period, as we assume that the specific contract is influenced by the 
legal framework in place while concluding the contract. 
 
To identify the reform effects we control for individual characteristics as well as for 
macroeconomic variables. As macroeconomic variables we use first, the real an-
nual growth rate of the GDP, as the demand for temporary agency work varies 
with the economic cycle, second, dummy variables at the regional level indicating 
the tightness of the regional labor market, and finally, the average annual unem-
ployment rate.
4 All macroeconomic indicators are attributed at the end of a spell 
because we assume that the prolongation of a contract might depend on the ac-
tual macroeconomic environment. 
 
As socio-demographic variables, sex, age and nationality are available but no valid 
information on the family composition and the marital status. To measure the skill 
level of temporary agency workers we use the variable education and vocational 
training. We define three categories: without vocational training, with vocational 
training and with a university degree. In addition we coded the potential work ex-
perience. 
 
Although our data set provides rich information at the individual level, we assume 
that there is unobserved heterogeneity, such as in motivation and social skills, in-
fluencing individual job stability. We use the recent employment history as a proxy 
to control for these characteristics. The IABS distinguishes between periods of 
employment and registered unemployment. There may be no notification in the 
                                            
4   A description of the estimated index of the regional labor market tightness can be found in Blien 
et al. (2005). As the index is correlated with the regional unemployment rate we included the 
time varying annual unemployment rate for West Germany. We estimated our models with the 
lagged GDP growth rate as well. But the lagged GDP variable is not significant. This is plausi-
ble because the increase in demand for temporary agency workers is seen as a leading mac-
roeconomic indicator.  
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data set for persons that have previously been outside the labor force, for pupils 
and students on vacation work, persons currently fulfilling a military service, self-
employed and jobseekers that are not registered with the employment agency. We 
coded these persons as well as workers without a notification for more than 30 
days before entrance into temporary agency work as not in the labor force. In addi-
tion, we used the categories previously registered as unemployed, employed in 
temporary agency work, and otherwise employed. 
 
Employment duration in a temporary employment agency may not only be influ-
enced by the regulatory framework but also by other reasons for terminating em-
ployment. Our data set contains no information on whether the worker or the tem-
porary employment agency has terminated the employment relationship. Particu-
larly workers who have found a regular job after the temporary agency work spell 
may have quit the temporary job. As a proxy for the termination decision of the 
worker we include in our sensitivity analysis in Section 6 a variable indicating 
whether a worker has found a regular job within 30 days after leaving the tempo-
rary work agency. 
 
In addition we control for the following job variables: The occupational status is an 
indication of which assignments a temporary agency worker may be best qualified 
for. We can distinguish between unskilled blue-collar workers, skilled blue-collar 
workers and white-collar workers. It might be assumed that this classification cor-
responds closely to the level of education. However, the data only show a slight 
correlation between these two variables. A temporary agency worker may have 
vocational training, but due to a previous period of long term unemployment or 
lack of employment experience, he might be placed as an unskilled blue-collar 
worker. 
 
The IABS provides detailed information on the predominant occupation. Because 
the activities of a temporary agency worker may vary between assignments, we 
use a broad classification und differentiate between six occupational groups: 
Technical occupations (engineer, mathematician, chemist), with high skilled work-
ers, service and clerical occupations. Manufacturing occupations are divided into 
three variables for the following reason: In Germany there is some indication that  
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especially the metal industry (e.g. automobile and aircraft industry) uses temps to 
circumvent the high bargained wages in this industry. Therefore we first of all pool 
typical occupations used in the metal industry in the dummy variable “manufactur-
ing occupations in metal branch”. According to our assumptions these workers are 
used as substitutes for regular workers and should therefore have longer employ-
ment spells. Second, we aggregate laborers without specific occupation, which 
belong to the manufacturing occupations as well, in a separate dummy variable.
5 
The remaining workers are aggregated in the variable other manufacturing occu-
pations. We expect that especially temps working as laborers and in service jobs 
do not require long training periods and should have therefore short employment 
duration. 
 
In order to control for human capital we included the remuneration of the tempo-
rary agency workers. Wages are censored by the social security contribution ceil-
ing. Since the remuneration of temporary agency workers in Germany is very low 
and gross wage differentials between temporary agency workers and regular em-
ployees are approximately 41 percent (Jahn/Rudolph 2002) it is likely that this limit 
is of no impact for our analysis. A consistent consumer price index for the observa-
tion period is not available. Therefore we deflated the wages by the GDP deflator. 
Spells with implausibly low daily wages and spells with wages above the social 
security contribution ceiling are excluded. We do not observe information on the 
type of contract, that is whether a worker holds an open-ended or a fixed-term 
contract. 
 
To account for heterogeneity among the agencies, we included the size of the 
temporary help agency. The capability of a temporary work agency to deal with 
short-term demand shocks depends on the number of its client firms and on the 
extent of diversification between the clients’ economic branches. Thus, there will 
most likely be a positive correlation between the firm size and the job stability in 
the respective firm. Some temporary work agencies are specialized in market 
niches that primarily employ university graduates. We hypothesize that such spe-
                                            
5   One might expect that there is a close positive correlation between unskilled blue-collar work-
ers and laborers. But it turns out, that the correlation is rather weak.  
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cialized temporary work agencies will provide employment contracts of longer du-
ration. In order to account for this effect, we defined the variable fraction of em-
ployees with a university degree within the temporary work agency. 
 
Changes of covariates during a temporary agency spell are not reported as soon 
as they take place. Therefore, we use the covariate values at the beginning of a 
spell and assume that they are time invariant.  
 
4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the inflow of all temporary agency 
workers given in our data from 1980 to 2003 differentiated by socio-economic 
characteristics. The corresponding median employment duration during the re-
spective regulatory regimes can be found in Table 3. The data refer to employ-
ment spells; right censored spells are included. We are able to identify 50,241 
temporary agency workers and 91,160 temporary agency work spells in total; 
1,446 temporary agency spells are censored. This leads to an average of 1.8 tem-
porary agency work spells per person during our observation period and may be 
an indication that temporary work agencies indeed are able to terminate an em-
ployment contract at the end of an assignment and to rehire a worker when a new 
client request is at hand. 
 
Table 2 shows that most temporary agency workers are male. This is true for our 
entire observation period. The proportion of non-German workers nearly doubled 
from 10 percent to 19 percent. Compared to the share of non-German workers in 
overall employment, which amounted to 7 percent in 2003, ethnic minorities are 
overrepresented in temporary agency work. With respect to the age distribution of 
temporary agency workers, we find the well known international pattern (e.g. Stor-
rie 2002). The age group below 35 years is clearly over-represented. However, 
their proportion decreased appreciably from 74 percent between 1980 and 1984 to 
around 62 percent in 2003. This is primarily attributable to the decline of the share 
of the age group from 15 to 24, which decreases from 40 percent to 28 percent 
during our analysis period. The fraction of workers aged 45 to 64 nearly doubled  
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up to 15 percent in 2003, but they are still underrepresented compared to their 
proportion of total employment (33 percent in 2003). 
 
Table 2:  Sample statistics of explanatory variables in %, West Germany 
  1980-1984 1985-1993 1994-1996 1997-2001 2002 2003 
Sex (Male)  74.8  76.4  76.6 72.2 73.4 74.1 
Nationality (Non German)  9.9 14.9 24.8 24.1 19.3 18.7 
Age (Average in years)  29.4 29.9 30.6 31.1 31.7 32.5 
 15-24  39.9  37.6  32.3 32.8 30.8 28.0 
 25-34  33.7  34.9  38.2 34.6 33.4 34.3 
 35-44  18.1  17.8  19.0 20.4 22.6 22.5 
 45-64  8.3  9.8  10.5 12.3 13.1 15.1 
Education and vocational 
training       
 
  No vocational training  19.1 21.6 25.5 30.6 26.9 22.0 
 Vocational  training  78.4 75.8 70.3 64.6 68.3 73.6 
 University  degree  2.5  2.6 4.2 4.8 4.8 4.4 
Occupational  status        
  Unskilled blue-collar  
      worker  38.8 45.1 54.1 60.9 63.7 62.2 
 Skilled  blue-collar  worker  40.7 37.4 30.2 20.1 19.8 22.0 
 White-collar  worker  20.4 17.5 15.6 19.0 16.5 15.9 
Occupation        
 Technical  3.0  2.5 1.8 1.6 1.2 1.9 
 Manuf.  other  19.4  12.5  10.3 8.6 8.4 9.0 
 Manuf.  metal  39.2  41.3 33.5 23.3 19.2 20.8 
 Laborer  9.8  16.1  26.2 34.6 39.8 38.8 
 Service  10.9  12.6  14.7 15.6 17.7 17.3 
 Clerical  17.7  15.0  13.4 16.3 13.7 12.2 
Previous  labor  force  status        
 Unemployed  24.2  23.8 31.2 28.6 33.5 42.8 
 Regular  employed  21.9 21.2 15.4 17.2 15.5 13.5 
  Employed in TAW  12.4 14.3 13.7 17.3 21.1 23.2 
  Not in the labor force  41.4 40.7 39.7 36.9 29.9 20.5 
Regular employed after 
TAW  32.6 38.2 35.4 33.2 23.7 21.2 
Still in TAW spell after … 
months in %       
 
  1    68 75 77 74 67 65 
  3    37 47 51 46 42 40 
  6    20 27 33 28 26 25 
  9    13 18 24 20 19 17 
  12    9 13 17 15 13 13 
No. of spells  6,451  23,654 12,321 34,024  7,004  7,706 
No. of individuals  4,542  15,155 9,112  22,086 5,528 5,859 
Source:  IABS, Institute for Employment Research 
 
Workers without vocational training, who usually are on short-term assignments, 
are over-represented in temporary agency work compared to their share in overall 
employment. Workers with a university degree are less likely to be in temporary 
agency work. 62 percent of all temporary agency work spells in 2003 are done by  
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unskilled blue-collar workers, while the fraction of skilled blue-collar workers had 
nearly halved since 1980. Two thirds of all temporary agency workers are em-
ployed in manufacturing or as laborers. This pattern has been stable since 1980, 
even though service jobs have become more important in the last few years. In 
2003 one among five temps has been previously out of the labor force and is 
probably only loosely attached to the labor market. Due to the economic downturn 
beginning in 2001 the share of the previously unemployed increased markedly 
from nearly 29 percent between 1997 and 2001 to 43 percent in 2003. Whereas 
about 22  percent of temporary agency workers were previously otherwise em-
ployed before 1985, this proportion declined to about 14 percent in 2003. The re-
form of 1997, which permitted fixed-term contracts and relaxed the synchroniza-
tion ban, generated a sudden increase in temporary agency workers previously 
employed in temporary agency work from about 14  percent before 1997 to 
17 percent between 1997-2001 and even 23 percent after 2003. Table 2 shows 
that only 67 percent of the temporary agency workers who started their jobs in 
2002 are still employed one month after entry and only 13 percent one year later. 
Obviously employment tenure in temporary agency work is rather short. 
 
Table 3, which shows the median of the employment duration, confirms that the 
employment tenure in temporary work agencies of two to three months is indeed 
very short. These figures are roughly consistent with earlier findings in the Nether-
lands and other western European countries (Zijl et al. 2004, Dekker/Kaiser 2000). 
Lane et al. (2003) show that temporary agency workers in the US had a median 
tenure of six months, Segal/Sullivan (1997) estimate an average of about six 
months as well. Moreover Table 3 shows that employment tenure is increasing 
with the maximum period for hiring out employees until 1994-96. This is totally in 
line with our hypothesis. After the marked deregulation in 1997 and 2003 the me-





Table 3:  Median employment duration in months, West Germany 
 1980-1984 1985-1993 1994-1996 1997-2001 2002  2003 
Total  2.0 2.8 3.2 2.7 2.2 2.1 
Sex                  
 Male  1.9 2.7 3.2 2.7 2.2 2.1 
 Female  2.4 3.1 3.4 2.6 2.2 2.1 
Nationality                  
 German  2.0 2.8 3.4 2.9 2.3 2.2 
 Foreign  2.5 2.7 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.7 
Age                  
 15-24  1.8 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.7 
 25-34  2.0 3.0 3.3 2.8 2.2 2.0 
 35-44  2.4 3.4 4.4 3.5 2.5 2.5 
 45-64  2.5 4.0 4.9 4.1 3.1 2.7 
Education and vocational 
training                  
  No vocational training  1.5 1.8 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.6 
 Vocational  training  2.1 3.1 3.6 3.1 2.5 2.2 
 University  degree  3.4 4.1 4.4 4.0 2.9 3.5 
Occupational status                  
  Unskilled blue-collar  
      worker  1.5 1.9 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.7 
 Skilled  blue-collar  worker  2.2 3.4 4.3 3.9 2.8 2.7 
 White-collar  worker  3.1 4.8 5.4 4.1 4.1 3.6 
Occupation                  
 Technical  3.8 6.1 7.3 7.7 6.4 8.8 
 Manuf.  other  1.5  2.2 2.7 2.4 2.0 1.7 
 Manuf.  metal  2.2  3.2 4.3 3.5 2.8 2.6 
 Laborer  1.6 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.7 
 Service  1.5 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.9 
 Clerical  3.0 4.4 5.2 4.0 4.1 3.4 
Previous labor force status                  
 Unemployed  2.7 3.5 4.2 3.7 2.3 2.1 
 Regular  employed  2.2 3.1 4.0 3.0 2.8 3.6 
  Employed in TAW  1.9 2.7 3.1 2.5 2.1 1.9 
  Not in the labor force  1.7 2.3 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.9 
Regular employed after 
TAW 2.6  3.8  4.9 4.0 3.5 2.9 
No. of spells  6,451 23,654 12,321 34,024 7,004 7,706 
No. of individuals  4,542 15,155  9,112 22,086 5,528 5,859 
Source:  IABS, Institute for Employment Research 
 
5.   EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
5.1 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
In order to identify the reform effects a Difference in Difference approach could be 
an estimation strategy. The purpose is to estimate the causal effect of an interven- 
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tion by comparing differences in outcomes before and after the change for groups 
affected by the intervention (temporary agency workers) to the same difference for 
unaffected groups (regular workers). In this case we have to assume that hiring 
and firing of regular workers and therefore their employment tenure is not affected 
by the changes in the law. But this assumption is too strong because client firms 
use temporary agency workers among other reasons to screen workers and to 
circumvent employment protection legislation for regular workers (Autor 2003, 
Houseman et al 2003). In an environment with strict regulation of temporary 
agency work, these workers would probably have been hired on a regular contract. 
An indication that client firms have indeed changed their hiring strategy at the 
margin is the increasing demand for temporary agency workers in Germany since 
1980, which goes hand in hand with the deregulation of the Labor Placement Act, 
see Figure 1. 
 
A second estimation strategy to estimate the effect of the legal changes on em-
ployment dynamics in temporary agency work is to adopt a hazard rate model.
6 To 
identify the effects of the changes in the law we included macroeconomic covari-
ates as well as individual covariates as described in Section 4. In our context, the 
model specifies the transition rate out of temporary agency work. Since our longi-
tudinal data set contains daily flow information on employment episodes, we use a 
continuous time model. We do not differentiate between various destination states 
and therefore adopt a single risk framework. The hazard rate  ( ) t h  is defined as the 
rate at which an individual exits from a state, given the individual survived there 
until time t. For the transition out of temporary agency work we use a mixed pro-
portional hazard model for multiple-spell data (van den Berg 2001, Hamerle 1989). 
The vector of explanatory variables is denoted by x, the baseline hazard by ( ) t λ . 
The influence of the observed characteristics is given by 
(1)  ( ) ( ) β ' exp 0 x x h = . 
To control for neglected covariates not given in our data set we introduce an un-
observed heterogeneity term denoted by ν . Thus, the mixed proportional hazard 
model is denoted by 
                                            
6   See Kiefer (1988) and Lancaster (1990) for an introduction to survival analysis.   
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(2)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ν λ ν ⋅ ⋅ = x h t x t h 0 , . 
The multiplicative heterogeneity term ν  is assumed to be constant across different 
spells of a given individual and to follow the Gamma distribution as proposed in 
Abbring/van den Berg (2006). For the sake of identifiability we assume the unob-
served heterogeneity to have a mean of one and a finite variance θ . As ν  is un-
observable, it cannot be estimated by the data. It is integrated out and only the 
varianceθ  is estimated and given in our results
7. 
 
For the baseline hazard rate we adopt a piecewise constant exponential model 
(see Blossfeld/Rohwer 2002). To gain flexibility we split analysis time during the 
first year of each episode into weekly intervals. Within each interval, the baseline 
hazard is constant as it follows the exponential distribution. From the 13
th month 
on we split the time axis into monthly intervals as the number of observations last-
ing longer than one year is too little to continue the weekly intervals. 
The splitting of the time axis can be described as follows: 
(3)  L τ τ τ τ < < < < = ... 0 3 2 1 . 
Assuming that the point in time ∞ = +1 L τ and  L l ,..., 1 = , we get L intervals with 
(4)  { } 1 | + < ≤ = l l l t t I τ τ . 
We now introduce a vector of period-specific coefficients denoted by α . These are 
constant throughout the respective interval. Equation (1) therefore changes to 
(5)  ( ) ( ) β α ' exp 0 x x h + = . 
The coefficients are estimated by a maximum likelihood method using the Newton-
Raphson algorithm. The estimates are presented in hazard ratio form which 
means a value below one indicates a covariate with a prolonging effect on em-
ployment duration. 
 
                                            
7   A description of hazard rate models with unobserved heterogeneity implemented in Stata can 
be found in Gutierrez (2002) and Cleves et al. (2002).  
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5.2 RESULTS OF THE LEGAL CHANGES ON EMPLOYMENT DURATION 
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates for the reform dummies and the observ-
able covariates. Compared to the reference period 1980-1984, the transition rates 
out of temporary agency work in Model 1, which is our preferred specification, dif-
fer significantly and are lower after the first (1985) and second (1994) change in 
the law. This is in line with our hypothesis in section 3. Obviously the prolongations 
of the maximum period of assignment have increased employment duration in 
temporary agency work. We take the longer employment duration as an indication 
that the strict regulation may have dampened the demand for temporary agency 
workers by the user firms. Although user firms primarily request temps for a short 
time period there may be a critical time period, until a temp has accustomed her-
self to the new job and is productive in the user firm. The prolongations of the 
maximum period of assignment might have improved the chances for the client 
firms to amortize the initial transaction costs. 
 
The transition rate after the reform of 1997, which allowed fixed-term contracts and 
relaxed the ban of synchronization is significantly higher than the transition rate of 
the previous regime. This result confirms our hypothesis in Section 3 as well. It is 
likely that the temporary work agencies have transferred the risk and the costs 
associated with periods without assignment to the temporary agency workers and, 
if they are eligible, to the unemployment insurance system. 
 
Surprisingly, the reform in 2002, which introduces the principle of equal pay after 
being on assignment for 12 months and increased the maximum period of as-
signment up to two years, went hand in hand with a further reduction in employ-
ment duration. With respect to our hypotheses in Section 3 this result is unex-
pected and may be explained as follows: Temporary agency work has long been 
subject to controversial discussions in Germany. The trade unions have been par-
ticularly vociferous in opposition to the flexible employment type. The objections 
were based on the general absence of collective bargaining agreements on tem-
porary agency work in Germany prior to 2003. Furthermore critics of temporary 
agency work express concern about the quality of flexible jobs. Temporary agency 
work is said to be associated with a lack of training possibilities and opportunities 
for career advancement. Consequently, there normally are long and controversial  
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policy debates before a new legislation comes into effect. At the same time, the 
temporary help sector is seen as highly flexible and adjusts to legal changes with-
out delay. We therefore presume that this is an anticipation effect resulting from 
the most recent reform that came into effect in 2003 and left regulation of the tem-
porary help sector subject to collective agreements. Expert interviews with tempo-
rary help agencies have confirmed this presumption. In 2003, when collective 
agreements were successfully bargained, agencies systematically terminated on-
going contracts, which were concluded under the former legal regime and re-
employed workers afterwards. 
 
As expected the transition rate after the reform of 2003, which abandoned nearly 
all regulations and left regulation of the temporary help sector subject to collective 
agreements, increased markedly. This result is expected and confirms the hy-
pothesis in Section 3. 
 
Table 4:  Exit rates of temporary agency workers, West Germany 
  Model 1  Model 2
a) Model  3
 b) Model  4
 c) Model  5
 d) 
Reform period (ref.: 1980 – 1984)           
  1985 – 1994  0.723***  0.796*** 0.733*** 0.724*** 0.730*** 
  (-16.48) (-15.72) (-16.27) (-16.46) (-15.99) 
  1994 – 03/1997  0.660***  0.751*** 0.668*** 0.660*** 0.665*** 
  (-17.44) (-16.32) (-17.33) (-17.42) (-17.14) 
 04/1997-2001  0.690***  0.816*** 0.674*** 0.690*** 0.690*** 
  (-17.45) (-13.43) (-19.15) (-17.44) (-17.50) 
 2002  0.790***  0.934***  0.742*** 0.790*** 0.778*** 
 (-9.26)  (-3.62)  (-12.03) (-9.26)  (-9.82) 
 2003  0.872***  1.042**  0.814*** 0.872*** 0.848*** 
  (-5.24) (2.14) (-8.13) (-5.23) (-6.29) 
Sex (male)  1.070***  1.133*** 1.076*** 1.070*** 1.055*** 
 (4.98)  (13.41)  (5.61) (5.00) (3.95) 
Nationality (foreign)  1.106*** 1.111*** 1.096*** 1.134*** 1.094*** 
 (7.57)  (12.18)  (7.19) (5.75) (6.76) 
Potential work experience  0.973*** 0.985*** 0.976*** 0.973***   
 (-14.59)  (-11.69)  (-13.80) (-14.53)   
Age (ref.: 15-24)           
  25-34       0.917*** 
       (-6.29) 
  35-44       0.776*** 
       (-16.00) 
  45-64       0.706*** 
       (-18.39) 
Education (ref.: no vocational training)           
 Vocational  training  0.991 1.094*** 0.990 0.988 1.009 
  (-0.72) (9.99) (-0.81) (-0.93) (0.72) 
 University  degree  1.149***  1.276*** 1.138*** 1.128*** 1.273*** 
 (4.87)  (12.02)  (4.68) (3.80) (8.34)  
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Table 4 (continuation) 
Fraction: employees with univ. degree 0.805**  0.912  0.880 0.811** 0.850* 
 (-2.56)  (-1.41)  (-1.54) (-2.47) (-1.93) 
Log. deflated daily wage  0.327*** 0.334*** 0.337*** 0.327*** 0.334*** 
 (-78.17)  (-98.60)  (-77.52) (-78.07) (-76.62) 
Occupational status  
(ref.: white-collar worker)       
 Unskilled  blue-collar  worker  1.212*** 1.187*** 1.189*** 1.214*** 1.195*** 
 (6.18)  (7.19)  (5.70) (6.17) (5.73) 
 Skilled  blue-collar  worker  1.125*** 1.094*** 1.114*** 1.121*** 1.109*** 
 (3.66)  (3.63)  (3.44) (3.54) (3.23) 
Occupation (ref.: manuf. other)           
 Technical  0.718***  0.729*** 0.734*** 0.720*** 0.722*** 
 (-7.59)  (-9.45)  (-7.25) (-7.54) (-7.47) 
  Manuf. metal   0.869***  0.870*** 0.876*** 0.869*** 0.872*** 
 (-8.18)  (-11.25)  (-8.00) (-8.20) (-8.02) 
 Laborer  0.911***  0.902*** 0.918*** 0.910*** 0.918*** 
 (-5.43)  (-8.00)  (-5.09) (-5.45) (-4.98) 
 Service  0.904***  0.882*** 0.908*** 0.903*** 0.912*** 
 (-5.38)  (-8.92)  (-5.25) (-5.42) (-4.92) 
 Clerical  0.862***  0.864*** 0.864*** 0.862*** 0.882*** 
 (-4.36)  (-5.66)  (-4.42) (-4.36) (-3.69) 
Previous labor force status  
(ref.: unemployed)       
 Otherwise  employed  1.030** 1.031*** 1.036*** 1.030** 1.051*** 
  (2.27) (3.01) (2.79) (2.27) (3.85) 
  Employed in TAW  1.146***  1.274*** 1.161*** 1.146*** 1.167*** 
  (10.46) (22.98) (11.61) (10.46) (11.83) 
  Out of the labor force  1.156*** 1.172*** 1.157*** 1.156*** 1.136*** 
  (13.15) (18.38) (13.48) (13.13)  (9.94) 
Termination by the employee          0.797*** 
       (-24.50) 
Firm  size  0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 
  (-18.68) (-23.60) (-18.42) (-18.65) (-18.25) 
Fraction: employees w. univ. degree 0.805**  0.912  0.880 0.811** 0.850* 
  (-2.56) (-1.41) (-1.54) (-2.47) (-1.93) 
Growth of GDP (West)  1.022*** 1.025*** 1.018*** 1.022*** 1.026*** 
 (7.53)  (10.90)  (6.37) (7.53) (8.88) 
Unemployment rate (West)  0.941*** 0.911*** 0.948*** 0.942*** 0.942*** 
  (-14.25) (-27.90) (-12.74) (-14.22) (-14.21) 
Interactions       
  Univ. degree * unskilled  
 worker      1.085   
      (1.33)   
  Foreign * unskilled worker        0.963   
      (-1.47)   
  Previously out of the labor  
  force * age (15-24)       1.075*** 
       (3.92) 
ln(θ) 0.405***    0.340***  0.405***  0.404*** 
  (-63.53)  (-67.17) (-63.52) (-63.91) 
AIC  110,670 125,140 105,527 110,671 110,220 
No. of observations  91,160  91,160 90,469 91,160 91,160 
Source:  IABS, Institute for Employment Research 
Note: 
a) model without control for unobserved heterogeneity, 
b) model excluding ob-
servations lasting longer than 5 years, 
c) model including interactions, 
d) model 
with age groups and termination by the employee. 
Further controls: potential work experience squared, firms size squared, re-
gional dummies. z-statistics in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
.01, .05, .10 levels, respectively.  
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Figure 2 shows the predicted survival functions based on Model 1. In the respec-
tive graphs consecutive legal regimes are compared over the first 365 days of em-
ployment duration in temporary agency work. For comparison we depict the sur-
vival function of the reference period as well. As indicated by the estimation results 
the strongest prolongation occurred after the reform of 1985. The highest employ-
ment duration and the beginning decline following 1997 are reflected in the second 
graph. Finally, the survival probabilities of contracts concluded in 2003 show only 
small differences to those concluded between 1980 and 1984. 
 




























































































































































5.3 COVARIATE EFFECTS 
The transition rates out of temporary agency work for male workers do significantly 
differ from that of female workers. Model 1 in Table 4 shows that the transition rate 
out of temporary agency work for ethnic minorities is higher. One reason might be 
that they are not well informed about their legal rights and it is therefore easier for 
the agencies to circumvent legal regulations. This presumption is confirmed if we 
calculate the number of consecutive contracts for ethnic majorities (1.9) which is 
higher than that of the German workers (1.8). Potential work experience increases 
the employment duration in temporary agency firms. It is reasonable to expect that 
temporary workers with long job experience will be easier to place than new en-
trants, who intend to gain their initial work experience in temporary agency work. 
 
One might expect that workers with higher qualification levels will be assigned to 
positions that require a longer time to become fully proficient at the job at hand. In 
this case the length of an assignment and thus the duration of the contract period 
should increase. The estimation does not confirm our expectation that vocational 
training lengthens the duration of employment as the coefficient is not significant. 
At first sight it may be surprising that the employment duration of temporary work-
ers with a university degree is shorter than that of the reference group. This initially 
unexpected result is explained as follows: The temporary agency work market in 
Germany is highly segmented. Large temporary work agencies predominantly 
place unskilled and seasonal workers. However, some temporary work agencies 
specialize in particular industry sectors and specific market niches that primarily 
require university graduates. This includes specifically skilled workers in informa-
tion technology, engineers and, most recently, also economists, who process 
complete projects with a limited time horizon. We hypothesize that such special-
ized temporary work agencies will provide employment contracts of durations that 
are well above average. In order to account for this effect, we used the variable 
fraction of employees with a university degree in a temporary work agency. The 
use of this variable is based on the hypothesis that temporary agency workers with 
university degrees employed in temporary work agencies of this type are more 
likely to obtain assignments that match their qualification. The results show that 
the hazard ratio of this variable indeed indicates a significant prolonging effect.  
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However, university graduates with degrees, for example, in philosophy or per-
forming arts who work for non-specialized temporary work agencies at levels be-
low their qualification must accept a shorter employment spell. 
 
The results in Table 4 indicate that the duration of a temporary agency job does 
depend on the previous labor force status. The reference group is the prior unem-
ployed. Employment duration for workers coming from regular employment is 
shorter. Probably they bridge the gap between two jobs. For workers with immedi-
ate prior experience in temporary work agencies we would expect a longer em-
ployment spell. But the estimation results show that the employment duration is 
shorter. One reason might be that temps who have repeatedly accepted temporary 
agency jobs have developed productive job search networks and quit as soon as 
they have found regular employment. The employment duration of temps coming 
from out of the labor force is significantly lower. The reason may be that they are 
only loosely attached to the labor market. 
 
In order to include the heterogeneity of the temporary work agencies, beyond the 
fraction of university graduates among its employees, our regressions include firm 
size. Large temporary work agencies can pool jobs across client firms more easily. 
Therefore they can offer workers more stable employment, even if specific as-
signments with client firms are temporary. The employment duration indeed in-
creases with the size of the agency. The transition rates out of temporary work are 
sensitive to business cycle fluctuations and are higher in tight labor markets with 
low unemployment rates. This result is in line with the study of Zijl et al. (2004) and 
may be attributed to a stepping-stone effect. 
 
Table 5 shows the predicted survival probabilities for an average person in our 
data set. The probability of staying employed in an agency for a given time rises 
until 1997. From that year on survival probabilities start to decline again. We also 
simulated this development for females, for foreigners and for workers with a cleri-
cal occupation. As already noted before, female workers or those with a clerical 
occupation experience more stable employment relationships in agency work. The 
reverse is true for foreign agency workers.  
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Table 5:  Predicted survival probabilities in %, West Germany 
  1980-1984 1985-1993 1994-1996 1997-2001  2002  2003 
Average person
a        
 1  month  69.5  76.9  78.7 77.8 75.1 72.9 
 3  months  31.3  43.1 46.4 44.8 39.9 36.3 
 6  months  10.4  19.5 22.5 21.0 16.8 13.9 
 12  months  1.4  4.5 5.8 5.1 3.3 2.3 
F e m a l e                 
 1  month  70.8  77.9  79.6 78.8 76.1 74.0 
 3  months  33.1  45.0 48.2 46.6 41.8 38.2 
 6  months  11.7  21.1 24.2 22.7 18.3 15.4 
 12  months  1.7  5.2 6.7 5.9 4.0 2.8 
F o r e i g n                 
 1  month  67.2  75.0  76.9 76.0 73.1 70.7 
 3  months  28.0  39.8 43.2 41.5 36.6 33.0 
 6  months  8.4  16.7 19.5 18.1 14.2 11.6 
 12  months  0.9  3.3 4.5 3.9 2.4 1.6 
Clerical occupation                 
 1  month  70.7  77.8  79.5 78.7 76.0 73.9 
 3  months  33.0  44.8 48.1 46.5 41.6 38.0 
 6  months  11.6  21.0 24.1 22.6 18.2 15.2 
 12  months  1.6  5.1 6.6 5.9 3.9 2.8 
Source:  IABS, Institute for Employment Research 
Note: 
a) The average person is calculated by the sample averages given in the pe-
riod 1980 to 1984. 
 
6.   SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In order to investigate the effect of different model specifications we perform a 
number of sensitivity analyses, see Model 2 to 5 in Table 4. In all specifications the 
effects of the reforms are robust. Model 2 tests whether we receive different re-
sults if unobserved heterogeneity is ignored. Table 4 shows that the estimations of 
the last two reform dummies change. Compared to Model 1, the hazard ratios of 
the respective reform periods increase. This is an indication that we have indeed 
to deal with unobserved heterogeneity of the workers and that hazard rates are 
overestimated if unobserved heterogeneity is neglected. The decision to include 
an unobserved heterogeneity term is also supported by the lower Akaike informa-
tion criterion (AIC) and the significant heterogeneity term in column 1 (Cleves et al. 
2002). 
 
Our data set includes the permanent administrative staff. However, we assume 
that their employment duration is not affected by the reforms and that their con-
tract duration should on average last longer than those of the temporary staff. In  
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Model 3 we therefore exclude observations lasting longer than five years. Again, 
the hazard ratios change only in size. 
 
The specification is extended by interaction terms in Model 4. As a proxy for highly 
qualified workers who are on assignments that are well below their educational 
level an interaction term for university degree and the occupational status unskilled 
worker is included. This dummy yields no significant effect. Furthermore, we pre-
sume that particularly unskilled foreign workers have a weak labor market position, 
see Section 4, and should therefore have shorter employment duration. To test 
this hypothesis we included an interaction term for this group as well. Again, our 
estimations show no significant effect. 
 
One shortcoming of our administrative data set is the lack of information on the 
reasons for job terminations. Therefore we cannot identify whether a temp has 
been dismissed or has quit the job. However, the reform effects we analyze are 
assumed to influence the behavior of the temporary work agencies and not that of 
their employees. To circumvent this shortcoming Model 5 assumes that a termina-
tion by a temp occurred if we observe a direct transition into regular employment. 
Model 5 replaces the potential work experience by age groups as well. The reason 
is that younger temps are often recruited among students or pupils, who use a-
gency employment to bridge the vacation gap. As they intend to end their em-
ployment relationship after a predefined short time period anyway, we assume that 
regulatory changes hardly affect their employment duration. The results of Model 5 
support that assumption as all the age groups above 24 yield significantly lower 
hazard rates. 
 
To test whether the results are robust with respect to the chosen time intervals we 
estimated Model 1 with monthly and two-weekly intervals respectively instead of 
weekly intervals. These estimations (not presented in Table 4) confirm that the 
reform effects do not change due to different time intervals
8. 
 
                                            
8   The results are available on request.  
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7.   CONCLUSIONS 
Most OECD countries have liberalized the regulation of temporary agency em-
ployment over the last two decades. To our knowledge, up to now there has been 
neither national nor international research regarding the changes in employment 
duration of temporary agency work accompanying these changes in the law. We 
used a mixed proportional hazard rate model to estimate the changes following the 
reforms of the Labor Placement Act in Germany since 1980. The stepwise deregu-
lation of the legal framework governing temporary agency work in Germany was 
intended to let firms respond more quickly to changes in output demand. The rapid 
growth of the temporary help sector in Germany has raised concerns because 
many view temporary agency jobs as “bad jobs”. Our first key finding is that labor 
turnover in the temporary work agency sector is indeed remarkably high. There is 
also some indication that temporary agency jobs increasingly lead to a repeating 
cycle between temporary jobs. Consequently, employment in temporary work 
agencies normally is only a short transitory period in the employment histories of 
the workers. It offers employment options particularly for male workers and disad-
vantaged groups, notably for poorly qualified workers, unemployed persons, for-
eigners, and young workers and is primarily used in manufacturing. 
 
Our second key finding is that there are sizeable changes in the employment dura-
tion of temporary agency workers after the changes in the Labor Placement Act, 
which are in line with our theoretical predictions. As expected, the first two re-
forms, which increased the maximum period of assignment, have had a positive 
impact on the length of employment in temporary work agencies. When fixed-term 
contracts were allowed and the synchronization ban was relaxed in 1997 the aver-
age employment duration dropped markedly. Obviously agencies shifted the risk 
of not being able to place a worker in a user firm to the temporary agency worker 
or the unemployment insurance system. This may have increased the precarious 
situation of temporary agency workers that many opponents feared. On the other 
hand the change in the law may explain why temporary agency work has in-
creased in Germany as much as it has since 1997. Obviously client firms have 
responded to the stimuli by increasing their demand of temporary agency workers. 
But we do not know yet whether these are additional jobs or whether firms have  
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substituted regular with flexible jobs. Surprisingly, the reform in 2002, which intro-
duced the principle of equal pay and increased the maximum length of assign-
ment, was followed by a reduction of the employment duration as well. We pre-
sume that this is an anticipation effect resulting from the most recent reform that 
came into effect in 2003 and left regulation of the temporary help sector subject to 
collective agreements. The exit rates out of temporary agency work for workers 
with a relatively weak labor market position as non-German workers, low skilled 
workers with no education, and the youngest age group are very high. The previ-
ous state in the labor market has a significant effect on employment duration. 
Workers who prior to temporary agency work were not in the labor force leave the 
temporary help sector more quickly than workers coming from employment or un-
employment. 
 
The evidence from our study provides insights into the potential important role of 
different kinds of regulation on the employment stability within the temporary help 
sector and we believe the subject warrants further research. One important ques-
tion is whether the changes in the law have affected the transition of unemployed 
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